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Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard: Breathing New
"Life" into an Old Fourteenth Amendment Controversy
As most Americans know, persons accused of a crime have
certain procedural rights that must be observed before the
government may convict and punish them. Criminal defendants are
guaranteed, for instance, a fair and speedy trial,2 the right not to
incriminate themselves at trial,' and representation by counsel The
U.S. Constitution also guarantees that the accused will not be
deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."5
But what rights remain after a person has been lawfully convicted
and sentenced?6
The United States Supreme Court has long struggled to define
the post-conviction rights of prisoners,7 most often in the context of
prison discipline8 or parole and probation decisions.9 Although due
1. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 499 (1966) (holding that law
enforcement must notify persons accused of a crime of certain rights before officers can
question them).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial .... ").
3. See id. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... ).
4. See id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
5. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Despite conviction and sentence, prisoners do not lose all of their constitutional
rights. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) ("[T]he convicted felon does not
forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of his conviction and confinement in
prison."). The Constitution's guarantee that no person will be deprived of "life, liberty,
or property without due process of law" applies to prisoners even during incarceration.
See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 219-27 (1989) (noting that the Due Process
Clause prevents prison officials from arbitrarily administering antipsychotic drugs to a
prisoner); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) ("Prisoners may also claim the
protections of the Due Process Clause.").
7. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-81 (1995) (describing the case
history of the Court's prisoner due process analysis); see also Karen H. Flax, Liberty,
Property, and the Burger Court: The Entitlement Doctrine in Transition, 60 TuL. L. REv.
889, 910-15 (1986) (discussing due process in prisoner-rights cases); Susan N. Herman,
The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the
Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 504-25 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's
treatment of the liberty interests of prisoners); Doug Rendleman, The New Due Process:
Rights and Remedies, 63 KY. L.J. 532, 645-64 (1975) (discussing the development of the
Court's due process doctrine as it relates to prisoners).
8. Prison discipline can come in many forms, including segregated confinement, see
Conner, 515 U.S. at 474; revocation of "good-time credits," Wolff, 418 U.S. at 546 & n.6;
or transfer to another prison, see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,240 (1983).
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process has considerable significance in these contexts, it becomes
even more important when the prisoner faces execution.10 Death, by
definition, is an ultimate deprivation of liberty. Perhaps because it is
so final, every state that allows the death penalty also allows the
governor or some other authority to set aside the death sentence by
granting clemency." Clemency, whether granted or denied,2 impacts
9. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1 (1979) (involving parole release); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(involving parole revocation). Because each case involves a new and different set of
circumstances, decisions regarding discipline or regarding probation and parole often
require prison administrators to exercise a certain amount of discretion. See, e.g.,
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480 (noting that parole decisions have discretionary aspects).
10. Justices of the Supreme Court have often repeated the view that, because of the
seriousness of the death penalty, the Court should carefully review cases involving its use.
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38
(1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357-58 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); see also, e.g., Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (noting the "heightened standard of reliability"
required by the Court in capital proceedings).
11. See ALA. CONST. amend. XXXVIII; ALA. CODE § 15-18-100 (1995); ARIZ.
CONST. art. V, § 5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-443 (West 1996); ARK. CONST. art. VI,
§ 18; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-204 (Michie Supp. 1997); CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8; CAL.
PENAL CODE § 4800 (West 1982); COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 7; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-17-101 (West 1998); CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 13; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-26
(West 1998); DEL. CONST. art. VII, § 1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4361 (1996); FLA.
CONsT. art. IV, § 8; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (West 1996); GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2, T 2;
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-20 (1997); IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 7; IDAHO CODE § 20-240
(1997); ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-13 (West 1997); IND.
CONST. art. V, § 17; IND. CODE ANN. § 11-9-2-1 (Michie 1992); IOWA CONST. art. IV,
§ 16; IOWA CODE ANN. § 914.1 (West 1994); KAN. CONST. art. I, § 7; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3701 (1995); KY. CONST. § 77; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(E); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:572 (West 1992); MD. CONST. art. II, § 20; MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-513 (1997);
MISS. CONST. art. V, § 124; MisS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-115 (1993); MO. CONST. art. IV, § 7;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217.800 (West 1996); MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 12; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-23-301 (1997); NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13; NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,132 (1994); NEV.
CONST. art. IV, § 14; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.080 (Michie 1996); N.H. CONST. pt. 2,
art. 52; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:21 (1988); N.J. CONST. art. V, § 2, 1; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:167-4 (West 1985); N.M. CONST. art. V, § 6; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-17 (Michie
1990); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1993); N.C. CONST. art.
III, § 5(6); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-23 (1993); OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2967.02 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. CONsT. art. VI, § 10; OKLA. STAT. tit. 57,
§ 332 (1996); OR. CONST. art. 5, § 14; OR. REV. STAT. § 144.640 (1997); PA. CONST. art.
IV, § 9; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 299 (West 1990); S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 14; S.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-21-910 (Law Co-op. 1990); S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 24-14-1 (Michie 1988); TENN. CONST. art. III, § 6; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-101
(1997); TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11; TEx. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 48.01 (West 1997); UTAH
CONsT. art. VII, § 12; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-5 (1995); VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-229 (Michie 1996); WASH. CONST. art. III, § 9; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.01.120 (West 1990); WYo. CONST. art. IV, § 5; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-801
(Michie 1997).
12. It should be noted that the U.S. Constitution does not require that states provide
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both the life and liberty of a prisoner. 3 Thus, the question arises
whether clemency impacts these interests in such a way as to require
states to follow federal due process procedures when considering
appeals for clemency by prisoners. This issue arose in a recent case
in which an inmate who had been sentenced to death sought to
challenge Ohio's clemency regulations.
In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,4 a death row
prisoner claimed that Ohio should have followed certain procedures
to protect his life and liberty interests during clemency proceedings.'5
In ruling against the inmate, eight Justices held that the State had not
violated his constitutional rights, but a majority could not agree on a
rationale. 16  Although five Justices agreed with Woodard that
clemency proceedings implicate a "life" interest under the Due
for clemency procedures for inmates. See Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 436 (1905).
13. Clemency is defined as an "act of [a] governor of [a] state when he commutes [a]
death sentence to life imprisonment, or grant[s] pardon." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY
1113 (6th ed. 1990). Clemency can be viewed conceptually in at least two ways. One
view is that clemency is merely an exercise of grace from the executive (typically the
governor of a state). See Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Note, Executive Clemency in
Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 136, 177 (1964). This view arises from the common law
notion that" 'the king may extend his mercy on what terms he pleases, and consequently
may annex to his pardon any condition that he thinks fit.'" Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256,
261 (1974) (quoting 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
394 (Garland Publ'g, Inc. 1978) (1721)). Another view is that clemency exists to correct
mistakes of the judiciary. See Michael A.E. Korengold et al., And Justice for Few: The
Collapse of the Capital Clemency System in the United States, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 349,
351 (1998). For a general discussion of issues surrounding the use of clemency, see id.
See also Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 655, 662 (1991) (arguing that clemency is an integral part of the American system of
justice); Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on
Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311, 331 (1996)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has a flawed belief that commutation remedies
injustice); Abramowitz & Paget, supra, at 137-41 (describing the history of clemency);
infra notes 214-28 and accompanying text(discussing the debate over clemency's role in
the American system of justice).
14. 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998) (plurality opinion).
15. See id. at 1249 (plurality opinion); see also Brief for Respondents at 3, Woodard,
118 S. Ct. 1244 (No. 96-1769) ("Mr. Woodard has an independent federally protected life
interest that remains intact and requires due process protection until execution takes
place."); Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 2, Woodard,
118 S. Ct. 1244 (No. 96-1769) ("A capital defendant ... has a constitutionally protected
interest in 'life' until the moment of his death."). Woodard also requested that his
mandatory clemency hearing be postponed and that his attorney be allowed to attend the
proceedings. See Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir.
1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998); see also infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text
(discussing Ohio's clemency procedures and Woodard's objections).
16. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1253 (plurality opinion); id. at 1254 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Process Clause,17 only four of these five felt that the amount of
process given to the prisoner was constitutionally sufficient."8 Justice
Stevens, in dissent, argued that Woodard did have a constitutionally
protected life interest for which the district court should determine
how much process is due.19
This Note first discusses the facts of Woodard, its history in the
lower courts, and the Supreme Court's resolution of the issues
presented by the case.20 After examining the role of due process in
the prison context,21 the Note then examines the Court's present
procedural due process analysis22 and traces the evolution of this
analysis in prisoner-rights cases.2a The Note also briefly discusses the
role of clemency in the American judicial system.24  Given that
background, the Note analyzes the underlying differences between
the plurality opinion in Woodard and the concurrence written by
Justice O'Connor and discusses difficulties with both.2 Finally, the
Note proposes a new analysis for capital clemency cases that would
address the concerns raised in the opinions of both Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. 6
The Ohio Constitution vests broad discretion in the Governor to
grant clemency for persons convicted of most crimes.27 Specifically,
the Governor may grant clemency "upon such conditions as he may
think proper."' Except to the extent that the Ohio Legislature is
17. See id. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 1254 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. See id. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). The Justices concurring with Justice O'Connor were Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. See id. at 1244.
19. See id. at 1254-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. See infra notes 27-90 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 102-22 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 123-213 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 214-28 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 229-303 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
27. See OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11.
28. Id. This phrase was not added until 1851, when the clemency provisions of the
Ohio Constitution were revised. See Kobil, supra note 13, at 662-64. The first version of
Ohio's Constitution, enacted in 1802, did not contain such an explicit statement. See id.
The only exceptions to the Governor's power to grant clemency are in cases of
treason and impeachment. See id. In these cases, he cannot grant a pardon or a
commutation at all. See OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11. In cases of treason, for example, the
Governor can only suspend the sentence, and the Ohio General Assembly considers
whether to grant a commutation, a pardon, or a reprieve. See id. The rationale behind
the Governor's limited power to grant clemency in these cases is not clear. See Kobil,
supra note 13, at 664. Interestingly, the treason limitation was not added to the Ohio
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authorized to regulate the clemency application and investigation
process, the Legislature cannot curtail the Governor's discretionary
clemency power. 9
In exercising its power to regulate the clemency process, the
Ohio Legislature created the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (the
"Authority") to conduct clemency reviews.3 1 Once a clemency
application has been filed or "when directed by the Governor in any
case," the Authority must conduct a "thorough investigation" into a
clemency application.3 1 To carry out this mandate, the Authority
promulgated rules to "establish a standard procedure for handling
applications for clemency in death penalty cases and for review of
death penalty cases where no application has been filed."'32 The rules
require that within forty-five days of execution the Authority must
arrange a clemency hearing for a date approximately twenty-one days
in advance of the scheduled execution date.33 Before the hearing is
held, the prisoner may request a personal interview with one or more
Constitution until 1851, while the impeachment limitation was included in the state's
original constitution. See id. at 662-64.
29. See OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11. The relevant text in section 11 states that the
Governor "shall have power ... to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, for all
crimes and offenses ... upon such conditions as [the Governor] may think proper; subject,
however, to such regulations, as to the manner of applying for pardons, as may be
prescribed by law." Id In a case involving this text, the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted
the phrase "manner of applying for pardons," noting that it
includes the entire application process .... We find that the General
Assembly's authority to regulate the application process extends to the time just
before the Governor reaches a substantive decision concerning a pardon. Once
this point is reached, the General Assembly's constitutionally granted authority
to regulate procedurally the pardoning power of the Governor is at an end.
State ex reL Maurer v. Sheward, 644 N.E.2d 369, 378 (Ohio 1994). The Ohio Supreme
Court has also noted that this language "does not imply that the General Assembly may
interfere with the discretion of the Governor in granting pardons." State v. Morris, 378
N.E.2d 708,714 (Ohio 1978).
30. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.07 (Anderson 1996).
31. Id.
32. Ohio Death Penalty Clemency Procedure § 11 (1994).
33. See id. § VI(B)(3). Attendance at the hearing by the prisoner or his counsel is at
the sole discretion of the Authority chairperson. See id. § VI(D)(3). At the hearing, the
Authority considers all of the information it has gathered, including the inmate's files and
any information previously provided. See id. § VI(E)(1).
This version of Ohio's death penalty clemency provisions is fairly new. In 1994, the
rules were changed to require initiation of the clemency review immediately after the
Ohio Supreme Court sets an execution date (rather than when the inmate files his first
federal habeas petition). See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Woodard, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (No. 96-
1769). The Legislature made this change to ensure that the Governor would have enough
time to conduct an adequate clemency investigation before the scheduled execution date.
See id.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
members of the Authority.34 Any information revealed at the
interview must be presented at the subsequent hearing, 5 and the
prisoner's attorney may not attend either proceeding. 6 After the
hearing, the Authority must make a recommendation to the
Governor to grant or deny clemency.37 The Governor is free to
follow or ignore the recommendation.
Eugene Woodard, sentenced to death for aggravated murder,39
was notified that a mandatory clemency hearing had been scheduled
for him and that he was eligible for a voluntary interview with one or
more Authority members.40 Under Ohio law, however, he could not
receive immunity for any incriminating statements he might make at
the voluntary interview.4' Instead of requesting an interview,
Woodard asked the Authority to postpone his hearing and interview
and asked that his counsel be allowed to participate in the
proceedings.42 When he received no response from the Authority,
Woodard brought a § 1983 action,43 alleging that the Ohio clemency
process violated his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
himself and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.44
34. See Ohio Death Penalty Clemency Procedure § VI(B)(4). If the inmate wants an
interview, the request must be made in writing to the Authority. See id. § VI(C)(1).
Upon receiving the request, the Authority chairperson appoints at least one board
member to interview the inmate. See id. § VI(C)(2). Only the interviewer(s) and the
inmate are allowed to be present. See id.
35. See id. §VI(E)(1).
36. See id. § VI(C)(2).
37. See id. § VI(E)(3).
38. See OHIO CONsT. art. III, § 11.
39. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Woodard, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (No. 96-1769). Woodard
was on Ohio's death row for crimes committed on June 20, 1990. See id. On that night,
Woodard and three others carjacked a vehicle and robbed the driver. See id. During the
course of the crime, Woodard shot the driver in the chest and left him for dead. See id. In
a later argument, Woodard insisted, "I should get the radio. I'm the one that shot the
guy." Id.
40. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1248 (plurality opinion).
41. See id. (plurality opinion).
42. See Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1997),
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998).
43. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... causes to be subjected, any ...
person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action ... or other proper proceeding for redress
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1996).
44. See Woodard, 107 F.3d at 1181-82. Woodard also moved for a temporary
restraining order against any clemency procedures in his case. See id. at 1182. Woodard
argued that a "premature review would serve as an obstacle to a later, more timely
clemency review, because such later review could only be obtained by leave of the
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Although the district court ruled for the State, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, holding in favor of Woodard on his Fifth
Amendment claim,4' while accepting in part and rejecting in part his
due process claim.46
As to the Fifth Amendment claim, the Sixth Circuit ruled that
Ohio's voluntary interview procedure presented Woodard with an
unconstitutional "Hobson's choice."'47 If he spoke at the interview,
anything Woodard said could be used against him in his
postconviction proceedings; if he refused to speak, however, his
chances of receiving clemency were substantially diminished.4S The
Sixth Circuit held, therefore, that the interview could place an
"unconstitutional condition" on Woodard's Fifth amendment right
Authority." Id.
The case was initially assigned to a magistrate judge, who found against Woodard on
a number of issues, including a substantive due process claim, a self-incrimination claim, a
claim that Woodard had a right to counsel in Ohio's clemency proceedings, and an Eighth
Amendment claim. See id. The magistrate judge did not address Woodard's additional
equal protection and Ninth Amendment arguments. See id. Despite Woodard's
objection, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in
full and entered judgment against him. See id.
45. See id. at 1193. The Sixth Circuit remanded the Fifth Amendment issue to the
district court to adduce further facts about the Ohio clemency process and to determine
whether the voluntary interview process in fact forced the inmate to risk self-
incrimination. See id.
46. See id. at 1193-94. The Sixth Circuit also dispensed with a number of other
constitutional arguments raised by Woodard on appeal, including claims arising under the
Equal Protection Clause, Eighth Amendment, Ninth Amendment, and the substantive
aspect of the Due Process Clause. See id. at 1193.
As to his Equal Protection claim, the Sixth Circuit noted that because Woodard
"failed to object when the magistrate judge did not address it in the report and
recommendation to the district court," it would not address the claim at the appellate
level. Id. The court noted further that addressing the issue would not likely have
changed its holding, because capital inmates are not a suspect class and the state "could
have a rational basis for treating capital and non-capital prisoners differently" during the
clemency process. Id. As to the other issues, the court noted that Woodard could have
no substantive due process claim because there is no fundamental right to receive
clemency, the Eighth Amendment is not implicated when procedural due process is not
offended, and there is "no precedent for attaching clemency rights to the Ninth
Amendment." Id.
47. Id. at 1189. According to the court, "'[t]he phrase "Hobson's choice" ... comes
from Thomas Hobson, an English liveryman who required every customer to choose the
horse nearest the door.... A Hobson's choice is thus an apparently free choice when
there is no real alternative.'" Id. at 1189 n.3 (quoting Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 813 n.5
(9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (first and third alterations in original)).
48. See id. at 1189. The court explained that the clemency interview represented a
benefit to Woodard because "it dramatically increase[d] Woodard's chances of being
granted clemency." Id. at 1190. The court did not address whether it mattered that
Woodard's chances for receiving clemency, with or without the interview, were probably
minimal in the first place.
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not to incriminate himself, and that such a condition would not be
justified by any compelling state interest.49
The Sixth Circuit accepted in part and rejected in part
Woodard's due process claim. It noted that the Supreme Court has
analyzed procedural due process claims by first determining whether
the inmate has a life or liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment." In the court's view, Woodard failed to satisfy this
"strand" of due process analysis because no life or liberty interest can
be created by clemency proceedings." Relying on prior Supreme
Court precedent, the court held, however, that Woodard did have
"original" life and liberty interests protected under a second "strand"
of due process analysis. 2 Because clemency is an "integral part" of
Ohio's adjudicatory system, the court believed that some amount of
process was due to prisoners subject to clemency proceedings. The
court remanded the case to the district court to determine exactly
what process was due. 4
Woodard appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari.55 On Woodard's Fifth Amendment claim, all of
the Justices agreed that the Sixth Circuit decision was incorrect. 6
Writing for a unanimous Court on this issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that because the interview was voluntary, Woodard could
not be "compelled" to speak within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. 7 The Court analogized Woodard's situation to that of
a criminal defendant facing a decision whether to testify at trial in his
own defense. 8 Although Woodard might feel pressure to speak to
improve his chances for clemency, Ohio's procedure did not force
him to do so.59
Woodard's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, however,
presented a much more controversial issue for the Court. Seven
Justices agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist's judgment that the
Ohio clemency procedures did not violate Woodard's due process
49. See id. at 1189. The court therefore remanded the case to the district court to
determine, after further fact-finding regarding Ohio's clemency process, whether the
process would impose an unconstitutional condition. See id.
50. See id. at 1182.
51. See id. at 1183-84, 1186.
52 Id. at 1186 (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1188.
55. See Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 117 S. Ct. 2507 (1997).
56. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1247.
57. See id. at 1253 (plurality opinion).
58. See id. (plurality opinion).
59. See id. (plurality opinion).
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rights,6 but only three Justices-Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-
agreed with his rationale for the judgment.61
In a plurality opinion in which these three Justices joined, Chief
Justice Rehnquist rejected each of Woodard's due process claims.62
The plurality reasoned that an inmate facing execution does not
possess a life interest in clemency proceedings, nor had Ohio created
such an interest in its particular proceedings.63 Further, the plurality
distinguished the Court's prior holding in Evitts v. Lucey, 4 rejecting
the notion that a "continuum" of due process exists at all stages of
the adjudicative proceedings.65
The Chief Justice first reasoned that there is no continuing life
interest in clemency proceedings that requires constitutional due
process protection.66 Under the Court's prior ruling in Connecticut
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat,67 the Chief Justice noted that an
inmate's interest in release is "extinguished by the conviction and
sentence.16  Clemency is therefore merely an inmate's "'unilateral
hope' ",69 for release and does not rise to the level of an interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 The Chief Justice
60. See id. (plurality opinion); id. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
61. See id. at 1247 (plurality opinion).
62. Of the eight Justices who concurred in the judgment, no more than four could
agree on any one opinion. See id. The holding with respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment, then, is limited to the facts of Woodard itself. See id. at 1253 (plurality
opinion); see also 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 602 (1995) ("When a fragmented
United States Supreme Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding may be viewed as that position taken by
those Justices who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.").
63. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1249-51 (plurality opinion).
64. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
65. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1251-52 (plurality opinion). As the Sixth Circuit
explained in Woodard, a continuum of due process protection means that the "degree to
which each component [of a state's adjudicatory system] forms 'an integral part' of the
overall adjudicative system determines the degree to which due process plays a role. Of
course, the more distant the procedure from initial proceedings, the less stringent the
requirements must be." Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178, 1186 (6th
Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998). But see Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1251 (plurality
opinion) ("Related decisions similarly make clear that there is no continuum requiring
varying levels of process at every conceivable phase of the criminal system.").
66. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1249-50 (plurality opinion).
67. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
68. Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1249 (plurality opinion) (citing Dumschat, 452 U.S. at
464).
69. Id. at 1250 (plurality opinion) (quoting Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 465).
70. See id. at 1250-51 (plurality opinion). The Chief Justice views clemency as merely
a matter of grace derived from the executive's historical right to grant pardon. See id. at
1251-52 (plurality opinion). But see Korengold et al., supra note 13, at 350 (stating that
the historical role of clemency was to correct mistakes of the judiciary).
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conceded, however, that there remains a "residual life interest, for
example, in not being summarily executed by prison guards. 7
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Ohio's clemency
procedures themselves do not create a protected due process
interest.72 Although the procedures are mandatory, he pointed out
that the Governor enjoys broad discretion in determining the factors
he will use to grant clemency; therefore, Woodard's expectation of
clemency was only minimal.73
Finally, the Chief Justice rejected Woodard's claim, premised on
the Court's 1985 decision in Evitts,74 that a continuum of due process
protection exists at all stages in the adjudicative process.7 According
to the Chief Justice, Evitts merely combined the holdings of two prior
lines of cases.76 One line held that a right to effective assistance of
counsel exists at trial,77 while the other held that criminal defendants
are entitled to certain procedural safeguards on a first appeal as of
right.78 In Evitts, reasoned the Chief Justice, "these two lines of cases
justified the Court's conclusion that a criminal defendant has a right
to effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right. '79 In
Woodard, the Chief Justice distinguished the discretionary nature of
clemency from the mandatory first appeal as of right discussed in
Evitts and concluded that "clemency is [not] an integral part of
Ohio's system of adjudicating the guilt or innocence of the
defendant." 0
Justice O'Connor filed a concurrence, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer,8 in which she disagreed with the Chief
Justice's conclusion that prisoners facing execution have no
remaining life interest. According to Justice O'Connor, an inmate
71. Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1250 (plurality opinion); see also infra notes 286-93 and
accompanying text (discussing the residual life interest).
72. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1251-52 (plurality opinion).
73. See id. at 1251 (plurality opinion).
74. In Evitts, the Court held that criminal defendants have a right to effective
assistance of counsel on their first appeal as of right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,
394-96 (1985).
75. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1251 (plurality opinion).
76. See id. (plurality opinion).
77. See id. (plurality opinion) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 US. 335, 344-45 (1980);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344-45 (1963)).
78. See id. (plurality opinion) (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,20 (1956) (plurality opinion)).
79. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394-96).
80. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor did not dispute the Chief Justice's
analysis of Evitts. See id. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
81. See id. at 1253 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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facing execution does have a continuing life interest that requires due
process protection. 8  Although an inmate's liberty interest is
extinguished by the conviction and sentence, an inmate retains an
interest in his life until he is executed.83 Regardless of state
proceedings, she asserted, an inmate facing execution is entitled to at
least minimal Fourteenth Amendment due process protections.84
Justice O'Connor nonetheless concluded that since minimal due
process requires only notice of the hearing and an opportunity to
participate in the interview, Woodard had in fact received the
minimum protections, and thus Ohio's clemency procedures did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.8'
In dissent, Justice Stevens vigorously opposed the Chief Justice's
view that Woodard did not have a constitutionally cognizable life
interest in clemency proceedings.8" Whereas an inmate's interest in
liberty is extinguished by conviction, Justice Stevens argued that
Woodard's interest in his life was not extinguished because he was
still alive.' He explained that the life interest at stake for Woodard
was much more important than the liberty interests at stake in prior
precedent cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 8 The finality of death,
he claimed, justifies more protection than the mere restriction of
physical freedom.8 9  Finally, having recognized a life interest
protected under the Due Process Clause, Justice Stevens argued that
the case should be remanded so that the district court could
determine whether Ohio's procedures provide adequate due
process.90
The controversy in Woodard primarily concerned the Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees all
persons due process of law.91 In accordance with this protection
against arbitrary or unfair state action, the State may only deprive an
individual of "life, liberty, or property" if it follows certain
procedures designed to protect that individual from arbitrary or
82. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
83. See id. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
84. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
85. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
86. See id. at 1254-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. See id. at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Connecticut
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,461 (1981)).
89. See id. at 1256 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. See id. at 1257 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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unfair state action.92 Such procedural due process "emphasizes
fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the
State."93 It is not always clear, however, when state action against
inmates violates the Due Process Clause.94
State action towards prisoners often implicates due process
concerns. Because an inherent tension exists between prisoners and
prison officials, determining when a prisoner's due process rights are
implicated is especially important. Prison officials need flexibility to
handle the myriad problems posed by incarcerating individuals
against their will; 95 however, too much discretion might invite
arbitrary results.9 6 To resolve this tension between the State and its
prisoners, the Supreme Court has developed a two-step analysis to
determine when and how much procedural protection is warranted. 97
First, a court looks to see if the State's action, such as discipline, has
affected some interest 9 recognized by the Due Process Clause.99 The
Clause protects only three interests: life, liberty, and property. 1°0 If
92. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,332 (1976).
93. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
94. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (disciplinary segregated
confinement of an inmate); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)
(commutation of life sentences); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (parole release determinations); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976) (intrastate transfer of an inmate); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(parole revocation).
95. See Conner, 515 U.S. at 482 (noting that the Court should give flexibility to "state
officials trying to manage a volatile environment").
96. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (expressing concern about the possibility of arbitrary clemency decisions
by state officials).
97. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)
("[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look
... to ... the interest at stake."); see also Flax, supra note 7, at 891 (describing the two-
step analysis); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv.
405,409 (1977) (noting the analytical shift in the Court's due process framework to a two-
step process); Rendleman, supra note 7, at 547 (explaining the Roth test for recognizing
due process interests).
98. Under the first step of this bifurcated analysis, it is not always clear what
constitutes a life, liberty, or property interest. Although liberty and property interests
have evolved into substantial constitutionally defined concepts, see Monaghan, supra note
97, at 405-44, the Court has rarely discussed life as a protected interest. See Daniel T.
Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Clemency, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 201, 217 (1993) ("[T]he Court has omitted mention of the
protection of life from most discussions of procedural due process.").
99. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-24.
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223; see also Rodney A.
Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The
Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69, 72 (1982) (noting that the Due
Process Clause only protects individuals who demonstrate a deprivation of life, liberty, or
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the court determines that one of these interests has been affected, the
second step is to determine how much process is due the prisoner.'
The Court's due process analysis began as a single-step analysis
under which the Due Process Clause was always implicated; the issue
was simply how much process was due."° In Goldberg v. Kelly,'03
families receiving state welfare payments alleged denial of due
process when benefits were terminated without prior notice and a
hearing.' 4 The Court held that a pretermination hearing was
required to provide the welfare recipient with adequate procedural
due process.'x5 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that "the
extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned
to suffer grievous loss,' and depends on whether the recipient's
interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in
summary adjudication."'0 6 Thus, the Court essentially treated the
phrase "life, liberty and property" as an open-ended grant of
procedural protection for any benefit that the government attempted
to take away from an individual.07
The Court refined its procedural due process analysis in Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth.' In Roth, an untenured college
professor who was not rehired after one year of service claimed that
the college's refusal to provide an explanation for its decision
violated the Due Process Clause because it infringed on an alleged
property right in his job. 9 In rejecting Roth's claim, the Court
decided that it would first look to the "nature" of the claimed
interest, rather than just its "weight" (as the Court had done in
property).
101. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
12 (1979).
102- See, e.g., Flax, supra note 7, at 891 ("[P]rocedural due process analysis proceeded
in a one-step fashion: when the government was accused of harming somebody, the Court
would determine whether the government was proceeding fairly in light of all the
circumstances.").
103. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
104. See id. at 255.
105. See id. at 264.
106. Id. at 263 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
107. The one-step analysis is primarily an academic distinction and not one that has
been recognized explicitly by the Court. See Flax, supra note 7, at 891; Herman, supra
note 7, at 489; Monaghan, supra note 97, at 406-07; Rendleman, supra note 7, at 646;
Smolla, supra note 100, at 76; Mark Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the
Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SUP. Cr. REV. 261, 262.
108. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
109. See id. at 569.
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Goldberg). ° Only after finding a constitutionally recognized interest
at stake would the Court determine the procedures needed to protect
that interest.' The Roth Court held that the interest in a non-
tenured teaching position did not constitute a constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest; therefore, it did not reach the
question of how much process Roth was due.'
The "bifurcated" due process analysis established in Roth has led
to controversy over defining the circumstances under which a life,
liberty, or property interest is at stake in any given case.113 One view,
labeled "positivism," holds that these interests can only be created by
the states themselves, through statutes, regulations, and other
practices or customs; 1 4 that is, certain state laws or practices must
affirmatively entitle the aggrieved person to the interest."5 In
110. See id. at 571. By looking solely at the "weight" of the interest, the Goldberg
Court considered only the impact of the state's action on the individual. See Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 262-63. Under this one-step analysis, if the state action inflicted a sufficiently
serious-that is, "grievous" -loss on the person, the Court would then remedy the due
process violation. See id. at 263. Thus, the Court assumed that some process was
automatically due the individual. In Roth, however, the Court bifurcated the analysis,
looking first to the "nature" of the interest before examining its weight. See Roth, 408
U.S. at 571. Under the "nature" prong of the analysis, the Court must identify whether
there exists a life, liberty, or property interest that would be protected by the Due Process
Clause. See id. For an interesting discussion of the practical effects of using either one of
these analyses in prisoner-rights cases, see Flax, supra note 7, at 891-905.
111. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571.
112. In holding that Roth had no constitutionally protected property interest in his job,
the Court noted that to have a property interest in a benefit, a person "must have more
than a unilateral expectation" of the benefit. Id. at 577. Eventually, the Court
transplanted this language into its liberty interest determinations. See, e.g., Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) ("The Due
Process Clause applies when government action deprives a person of liberty or property
.... [T]o obtain a protectible right, 'a person ... must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it.' "(quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577)).
113. See Flax, supra note 7, at 891-99; Herman, supra note 7, at 504-28; Rendleman,
supra note 7, at 645-64; Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A
Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CAL. L. REv. 146, 151-56 (1983).
114. See Flax, supra note 7, at 889 (discussing the "positivist" view of liberty).
Another commentator argues that the development of the positivist doctrine is merely a
reinstatement of the discredited "right-privilege" distinction in constitutional law. See
Smolla, supra note 100, at 69. The right-privilege doctrine is the view that government
benefits (such as employment) are merely privileges with no procedural rights attached.
See id. By receiving the benefit, the recipient is not entitled to complain if it is taken
away for any reason. See id. at 72. Perhaps the most well-known statement of the
doctrine was made by then-Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes when, in rejecting the wrongful dismissal claim of a police officer, he noted that
"[tihe petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E.
517,517 (Mass. 1892).
115. See Flax, supra note 7, at 891. As Professor Flax explains, under a positivist view,
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Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional
Complex,"6 instance, the Court employed a positivist conception of
liberty when it held that the mandatory nature of the Nebraska
parole statute sufficiently constrained the discretion of state officials
to create a legal entitlement."
7
An alternative view, most often expressed by Justice Stevens in
prisoners' post-conviction rights cases, has held that inmates have
due process rights that exist independently of state statutes and
regulations."1 These rights emanate from the basic human dignity
that every person possesses, even prisoners who have been
substantially deprived of their liberty." 9 Under this view, the impact
of the state action on the prisoner is more important than the alleged
source of the due process right.2 0  Actions that are "sufficiently
grievous ' entitle the prisoner to some amount of due process."
Since its 1972 decision in Morrissey v. Brewer," the Court has
courts do not determine due process interests by looking at how much harm the
government action has caused. See id. Rather, regardless of the harm, the interest in due
process must arise out of the language of a state pronouncement which gives a person
some expectation that due process is deserved. See id. Only if some positive law has
created the interest will a court determine how much process is due as a result of the state
action. See id.
In determining the amount of process due, courts use a test formulated by the
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The test considers three
factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Id. at 335. At least one commentator has criticized this test. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
Professor Mashaw has argued that the test does not consider "the full range of concerns
embodied in the due process clause." Id. at 30. Moreover, the test does not consider the
value of due process protections to the individual plaintiff requesting them. See id. For
these reasons, he has suggested a more "value-sensitive approach" to the due process
calculus by considering perspectives such as individual dignity, equality, and tradition.
See id. at 46-59.
116. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
117. See id. at 14.
118. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 232-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States ex rel. Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701,712-13 (7th Cir. 1973)).
120. See id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 234 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
906 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77
struggled with the question of when and to what degree prisoners are
entitled to due process.124 In Morrissey, an early prisoner-rights case,
the Court held that a prisoner's interest in maintaining parole status
is protected by the Due Process Clause.121 The Court noted that the
amount of process due a prisoner facing parole revocation was "the
extent to which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss.' "126 The Court determined what constituted a grievous loss by
considering" 'the precise nature of the government function involved
as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action.' "127 Essentially, then, in order to determine the
amount of process due, the Court balanced the individual's interest in
remaining free on parole against the government's interest in dealing
with parole violations. 12
124. See generally Flax, supra note 7, at 910-15 (discussing due process in the prisoner-
rights area); Herman, supra note 7, at 503-28 (explaining the liberty interests of
prisoners); Rendleman, supra note 7, at 645-64 (discussing due process in prison).
125. Plaintiff Morrissey's parole was revoked because, according to his parole officer,
he had purchased a car under false pretenses, lied to the police, and violated other
provisions of his parole agreement. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 473. The parole officer
also cited the repeated nature of the violations as justification for parole revocation. See
it.
126. Id. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
127. Id. (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961)). Although the Court couched its analysis in terms of determining the
"nature" of the interest at stake, see id. at 481-82, the Court apparently considered only
the "weight" of the government's action on the individual, see supra note 110 (discussing
the difference between "nature" and "weight").
128. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. Roth and Morrissey were decided on the same
day. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 564 (1972); Morrissey,
408 U.S. at 471. Although the language of the Morrissey Court indicated that it used what
would be a two-step analysis under Roth, see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 ("The question is
... whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or
property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment." (emphasis added) (citing Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)), the Court, in a single-step, merely applied the "grievous loss"
standard-a "weight" determination-to decide the case, see id. at 481; see also supra
note 110 (discussing the difference between "nature" and "weight"). The Court first
seemed to assume that Morrissey had a liberty interest at stake, see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
481; it then considered the "weight" or impact of parole revocation on Morrissey, see id.
In Roth, the Court made explicit what was assumed in Morrissey by relegating the
"weight" inquiry to the second step of the bifurcated analysis. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-
71. Thus, Morrissey appears to have marked a transition period in the Court's due
process analysis. See Monaghan, supra note 97, at 408-09 (noting that Morrissey "laid the
groundwork" for the shift in standards).
Factual differences in these cases may provide a possible explanation for the Court's
use of seemingly different standards in similar cases decided on the same day. Roth
involved a college professor who merely faced the loss of his job, for which he was
untenured. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571. Morrissey, however, involved a person on parole
who faced being put back in prison-a complete loss of his liberty. See Morrissey, 408
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In striking the balance, the Court declared that an inmate on
parole has a "conditional" interest in liberty that is protected by at
least minimum procedural safeguards. 129  The Court noted that a
parolee, who is not incarcerated but is subject to state supervision,
has a greater expectation of freedom than an imprisoned inmate
hoping for parole.130 The parolee, it explained, also enjoys many of
the same freedoms as individuals with unqualified liberty.13' Thus,
revocation of parole would inflict a "grievous loss" on the parolee
such that some process is due. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that the source of the parolee's due process right
rests partly on an "implicit promise" between the parolee and the
State that he will remain free so long as he follows the conditions of
parole. 33 Although the State has many interests in further restricting
the liberty of the parolee, the Court held that those interests are not
so important as to allow completely unfettered parole revocation.' 34
Limiting its holding in Morrissey, the Court in Meachum v.
Fano135 considerably narrowed the range of interests for which
prisoners could claim due process protection by applying the two-step
analysis 136 developed in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth.137
U.S. at 481. By emphasizing only the weight of the State's action in a one-step analysis in
Morrissey, the Court was able to account for the serious impact of parole revocation on
Morrissey. See id. Indeed, the Court devoted a large portion of its opinion to explaining
the seriousness of this potential loss. See id. Roth, however, appears to have been a
better case factually to focus on the first of the two steps-determining whether a
protected interest was at stake-because Roth attempted to claim a property right in an
untenured position. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571.
129. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. According to the Court, the "minimum" due process required a hearing
before revocation to determine whether the parole violation in fact occurred. See id. at
485. At the hearing, the parolee was entitled to written notice of the violations, disclosure
of the evidence against him, the opportunity to present witnesses, the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, an impartial hearing body, and a written statement of the
reasons for parole revocation. See id. at 486-87.
133. See id. at 482. Although the Morrissey Court has been characterized as using a
positivist approach to liberty, see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976), it has been
argued that this characterization is "revisionist," Herman, supra note 7, at 505. By noting
the "implicit promise" between the state and the prisoner in Morrissey, the Court
appeared to rely partly on the positivist conception but, as Professor Herman notes, the
majority opinion did not even quote or reproduce the parole statutes and regulations
affecting Morrissey. Id.
134. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
135. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
136. See id. at 223-24; see also Flax, supra note 7, at 897-98 (discussing Meachum).
137. 408 U.S. 564 (1972); see also supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts and holding of Roth).
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In Meachum, an inmate asserted that he was entitled to due process
protection from being transferred from one prison to another with
substantially less favorable conditions. 138  The Court relied on its
decision in Roth for the proposition that "the determining factor is
the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight.1 39 Thus,
the Court did not automatically consider how much process was due
as it had done in Morrissey.' Instead, the Court asked a threshold
question: Is the transfer of an inmate from one prison to another
sufficient to "invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause"?14'
To justify its use of this two-step analysis in the context of
prisoners, the Court rejected the notion "that any grievous loss
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke" due
process. 42 The Court noted that although prisoners continue to have
constitutionally protected liberty interests even after conviction, a
conviction "sufficiently extinguishe[s] the defendant's liberty interest
to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons. ' 143 So long
as the confinement is "within the normal limits or range of custody
which the conviction has authorized the State to impose," the State's
actions do not trigger the Due Process Clause. 4 Thus, even though
the inmate's transfer represented a substantial loss to the prisoner (to
the extent that prison life was more difficult), it did not automatically
warrant consideration by the Court as to what process was due. In
sum, because the Court did not detect a liberty interest in Meachum's
transfer, it did not even consider the question of what process, if any,
138. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 216. Meachum was transferred from a medium
security facility to a maximum security facility based on informants' reports that
Meachum had been involved in nine serious fires at the medium security complex. See id.
at 217.
139. Id. at 224 (discussing Roth's contribution to the Court's present procedural due
process analysis).
140. See id. at 223-24.
141. I& at 224.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 225. Significantly, the majority in Meachum (including then-Justice
Rehnquist) recognized that under certain circumstances procedural due process rights can
derive from sources other than state statutes and regulations. See id. at 223-25. A state's
conduct affecting a prisoner can implicate the Due Process Clause directly if the action is
beyond the scope of the lawfully imposed sentence, regardless of whether a statute or
regulation also creates a due process interest. See id. Only some state actions, then, will
implicate the Due Process Clause directly under this analysis. See id. Justice Stevens also
recognized that state action can trigger the Due Process Clause automatically. See id. at
230-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But for Justice Stevens, every state action implicates due
process; the only relevant issue is the extent to which due process is implicated. See id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Under Justice Stevens's analysis, then, prisoners are protected
by the Due Process Clause against a wider range of state actions.
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was due. 45
Significantly, the Court noted that if it held in favor of
Meachum, it would subject many other discretionary decisions by
state prison officials to judicial review. 46 These decisions, said the
Court, "traditionally have been the business of prison administrators
rather than of the federal courts."'47  The Court believed that
requiring due process protections in inmate transfer situations would
open the door to challenges by inmates of virtually every other
discretionary state decision that inflicted some loss on the inmate 148 -
the Court was "unwilling to go so far."'1 49
Finally, the Meachum Court, in recognizing that the sources of
inmates' liberty interests are often limited to those found in state
laws or regulations' 50 applied a positivist conception of liberty as
further justification for barring Meachum's claim. The Court noted
that no Massachusetts law gave prisoners a right to remain at a
particular prison.1 However, state law did give prison officials
broad discretion to transfer prisoners for almost any reason. 52 The
Court held, therefore, that inmates have no substantial expectation of
remaining at any particular prison and thus no due process is
required before transferring them. 3
Justice Stevens, in dissent, sharply disagreed with the majority's
conception of liberty. 4  He argued that the source of a liberty
interest does not rest solely in the content of state laws and
regulations;155 rather, it lies in the "basic freedom" protected by the
145. See id. at 223.
146. See id. at 225.
147. Id.
148. See id. ("[U]nder the approach urged here, any transfer, for whatever reason,
would require a hearing .... "). But Justice Stevens, in dissent, disagreed with this
assessment. See id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[G]rievous loss ... is somewhat
flexible. I would certainly not consider every transfer within a prison system, even to
more onerous conditions of confinement, such a loss.").
149. Id. at 225.
150. See id.; see also Flax, supra note 7, at 897-98 (discussing Meachum); supra notes
113-17 and accompanying text (discussing the positivist view of the source of due process
interests).
151. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226. Meachum apparently had attempted to use Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), to bolster his claim. In Wolff, the Court held that a
prisoner's liberty was implicated when he lost good-time credits towards release because
of serious misconduct. See id. at 558. The Court in Meachum emphasized, however, that
"[t]he liberty interest in Wolff had its roots in state law." Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226.
152. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 227.
153. See id. at 228.
154. See id. at 229-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Constitution.5 6  In other words, humans have liberty interests
because they have freedom, not because the State chooses to let them
be free. 57 According to Justice Stevens, the relevant question, then,
is to what degree the State may deprive an inmate of liberty by virtue
of his conviction and sentence. 58 The prisoner retains a "residuum of
constitutionally protected liberty," Justice Stevens reasoned, and if
the State's deprivation amounts to sufficiently serious loss of that
protected liberty, then the Constitution affords him procedural
safeguards. 59
Cases decided after Meachum tended to rely on its limited
conception of liberty for inmates. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,160 the Court applied the
same reasoning as it had in Meachum, although it reached the
opposite result.161 Greenholtz required the Court to consider whether
parole-release determinations by the Nebraska Board of Parole
implicated a prisoner's liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause. 62 As prescribed by Roth and Meachum, the Court first
looked to state law to determine if such an interest existed. 163
Nebraska statutes described in great detail the circumstances and
procedures under which an inmate could be paroled, requiring the
Board of Parole to release inmates under certain conditions unless
one of four specified reasons for denial was present. 64 Because of
156. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained, "I had thought it self-
evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal
unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather
than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 230-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 232 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority in Meachum (including then-
Justice Rehnquist) did not appear to disagree that an inmate retains a residuum of liberty.
In the majority's view, the residuum of liberty only protects the inmate from state actions
that are outside the scope of the lawfully imposed sentence. See id. at 225. For Justice
Stevens, the residuum of liberty protects the inmate from all state actions; it is what
requires procedural protection under the Due Process Clause, depending on the
seriousness of the impact on the inmate's residual liberty. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Both Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist carried forward their respective
conceptions of this "residuum" in Woodard. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1251 (plurality
opinion); id. at 1255 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); infra notes
286-87 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's use of the "residual"
life concept in Woodard).
160. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
161. See id. at 15-16.
162. See iL at 3.
163. See id. at 7.
164. See id at 11. The relevant statute provided:
[Vol. 77910
1999] PRISONERS' POST-CONVICTION RIGHTS 911
the mandatory language in the statute, the Court reasoned that
prisoners have a legitimate expectation of release when parole
conditions are met.'65 Thus, the State had created a liberty interest in
parole release that the Due Process Clause would protect.'66
The Greenholtz Court emphasized that the mere possibility of
parole was not in itself a sufficient basis for implicating federal due
process protection. 6 7 Greenholtz argued that the interest in parole
revocation, recognized by the Court in Morrissey, was the same as the
interest at stake in a parole-release determination by the State. 68
The Court rejected this argument by carefully distinguishing parole
release and parole revocation.169 According to the Court, "[t]here is a
crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in
parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires.' 7 0
Thus, the Court reasoned that it is worse to have freedom (by virtue
of parole), and then have it revoked, than not to have freedom in the
first place (because of imprisonment) and have it denied.' 71 State
decisions regarding parole release and parole revocation, therefore,
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender
who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the
opinion that his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of
parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote
disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional
discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or
other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a
law-abiding life when released at a later date.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1114(1) (1976) (repealed 1991).
165. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
166. See id. The Court went on to hold, however, that the procedural protections in
the Nebraska statute were sufficient to satisfy the federal due process requirements. See
id. at 16. Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Court did not require that a formal hearing be
held for every inmate or that every adverse decision by the Board be accompanied by a
statement from the Board indicating the evidence on which it relied. See id.
167. See id. at 11. Justice Powell disagreed with this view in a separate opinion. See id.
at 19 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am convinced that the
presence of a parole system is sufficient to create a liberty interest .....
168. See id. at 9.
169. See id.
170. Id. The Court, apparently aware of the relative weakness of this argument,
explained further that "'it is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person's
justifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional freedom so long as he abides by the
conditions of his release, than to his mere anticipation or hope of freedom.'" Id. at 10
(quoting United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d
Cir. 1971)).
171. See id. at 10.
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were sufficiently different for the Court to justify not providing the
same protection to both. 72
Strengthening its positivist position in Olim v. Wakinekona,'7 3
the Court reasserted its view that state law is the primary source of
liberty interests for prisoners.7 4 In Olim, a prisoner challenged his
transfer from a prison in Hawaii to a prison on the mainland."5
According to Hawaii's prison regulations, a hearing was required for
any transfer that would result in a substantial loss to the inmate.176
The regulations required a committee to recommend a course of
action to the prison administrator who, according to the Court, had
no standards or criteria governing or burdening his discretion to
follow or ignore the recommendation. 77
Holding that the State had not created a protectable liberty
interest, the Court examined Hawaii's prison regulations and
determined that the prison administrator was afforded significant
discretion in transfer decisions.' Whereas the Nebraska statute in
172. See id.
173. 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
174. See id. at 249. The Court also reaffirmed the view it had asserted in Meachum
that the Due Process Clause can be implicated directly if the state takes action against a
prisoner that is not "'within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction
has authorized the State to impose.'" Id. at 247 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
225 (1976)).
175. See id. at 240. Olm could not remain at his maximum-security facility due to
impending construction. See id. at 241. Because no other Hawaiian maximum-security
facility could offer the correctional programs he needed, and because he was still
considered a security risk (having been convicted of several felonies while in prison),
Olim was transferred to another maximum-security prison on the mainland. See id.
176. See id. at 242. (citing paragraph 3 of Rule IV of the Supplementary Rules and
Regulations of the Corrections Division, Hawaii Dep't of Social Servs. & Housing
(1976)).
177. See id. at 242-43. The regulations stated:
"[The Administrator] may, as the final decisionmaker:
(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or
(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security,
or welfare of the staff, inmate ... , other inmates ... , institution, or
community and refer the matter back to the Program Committee for further
study and recommendation."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting paragraph 3(d)(3) of Rule IV of the Supplementary
Rules and Regulations of the Corrections Division, Hawaii Dep't of Social Servs. &
Housing (1976)).
178. See id. at 249. Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan in full and
by Justice Stevens in part, echoed a theme often promoted by Justice Stevens in prisoner-
rights cases: Inmates have liberty interests outside of those created by state law because
they retain a "significant" amount of constitutionally protected liberty despite
incarceration. Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because the interstate transfer of an
inmate "represents a substantial qualitative change" in that it has "banished [the inmate]
from his home," it implicates a liberty interest, regardless of state law. Id. at 252
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Greenholtz17 9 had restricted the discretion of prison administrators,
the Court noted that in Hawaii officials could transfer a prisoner
" 'for whatever reason or for no reason at all.' "I" Accordingly, the
Court proclaimed: "Process is not an end in itself." '181 As a result,
where prison statutes and regulations give unbridled discretion to
administrators, there is no liberty interest for process to protect.18
The" Court's decision in Connecticut Board of Pardons v.
Dumschat' 3s foreshadowed the conflict that lay ahead in Woodard. In
Dumschat, prisoners serving life terms challenged their denials of
commutation by the State Board of Pardons as improperly infringing
on their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.184 The prisoners
argued that each individual who is denied commutation should at
least receive a written statement of the reasons for the denial.185 The
Second Circuit, relying on the fact that the Connecticut Board of
Pardons had been granting over seventy-five percent of all
applications for commutation from prisoners serving life sentences,
held that the likelihood of receiving commutation created a
protectable liberty interest in commutation. 86
In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the mere existence of the
opportunity for commutation did not create a protectable liberty
interest in commutation."8 A prisoner's expectation of commutation,
the Court noted, is much like his expectation of parole release-only
a "unilateral hope." '188 The statistical likelihood of commutation is
not sufficient to create a liberty interest; instead, the prisoner must
show that the State intended to inhibit the discretion of the
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text (discussing Greenholtz).
180. Olim, 461 U.S. at 250 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,228 (1976)).
181. Id.
182. See id.; see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (holding that
inmates have a protected liberty interest in administrative segregation because the state's
regulations contained mandatory directives constraining administrative discretion); Jago
v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 19 (1981) (holding that Ohio statutes do not create a
protectable liberty interest in parole release); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557
(1974) (holding that a Nebraska statutory provision granting mandatory credits for good
behavior gave prisoners a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause).
183. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
184. See id. at 459.
185. See id. at 461.
186. See Dumschat v. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons, 618 F.2d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
187. See Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 465.
188. Id. (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 11 (1979)).
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decisionmaker.'8 9 Thus, the Court held that a State does not create a
liberty interest merely because " 'a wholly and expressly
discretionary state privilege has been granted generously in the
past.' ,190
The Court then held that the Connecticut commutation statute
at issue created no protectable liberty interest since it set no standard
criteria by which the Board of Pardons was required to approve
commutations. 191 Contrasting this statute with the statute at issue in
Greenholtz, the Court noted that the Connecticut statute contained
"no definitions, no criteria, and no mandated 'shalls.' "I' At most,
the Connecticut statute gave prisoners the right to seek commutation;
according to the Court, it did not give them any constitutional rights
in the commutation itself.9 3
As it had done in prior prisoner-rights cases, the Dumschat
Court looked for protectable liberty interests in positive sources-
state statutes, regulations, and other practices. 194 The Court also
reaffirmed that a prisoner's liberty interest is extinguished by his
conviction. 195 Much like his dissent in Meachum, however, Justice
Stevens vigorously opposed this view.1 96  He again argued that
prisoners retain a "residuum of constitutionally protected liberty" at
all times while in the state's custody.Y He argued that this liberty
interest is never fully extinguished. 9  If it were, the state's
commutation process could be "totally arbitrary" with no recourse
for the inmates. 9
More recently, in Sandin v. Conner,20 the Court further
restricted the range of liberty interests requiring due process
protection. In Conner, an inmate challenged his thirty-day
189. See id.
190. Id. (quoting Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 444 n.5 (1979)).
191. See id. at 466.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See id.; see also supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text (discussing the
approaches the Court has used to determine the availability of prisoners' liberty
interests).
195. See Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal &
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)).
196. See id. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens especially opposed this
view in Woodard, arguing that an inmate's interest in life-as opposed to liberty-can
never fully be extinguished. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
197. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
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segregated confinement °1 on the grounds that the Due Process
Clause required the State to allow him to present witnesses at the
disciplinary hearing 2 The Court rejected his claim, holding that
disciplinary confinement does not directly implicate the Due Process
Clause, and that the State had not implicated due process concerns in
the confinement.20 3
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
noted that Meachum and its progeny had created two undesirable
results.204 First, this line of cases discouraged states from codifying
prison management regulations in order to avoid creating liberty
interests.0 5  Second, Meachum and its progeny led to "the
involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of
prisons."2a6 To manage such a "volatile environment," Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote, prison officials need flexibility to fine-tune the
"ordinary incidents of prison life. 27
To address these problems, the Court in Conner imposed an
additional requirement for state-created liberty interests-the
circumstances of the deprivation of liberty must impose "an atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. '28  Consequently, the assumption that any
punitive action taken by the State creates a liberty interest is
incorrect.2 9 As the Court noted, a wide range of discipline falls
within the range of activities permitted by the Due Process Clause.210
Accordingly, the Court held that Conner's discipline in this case was
not "atypical" or "significant. '211  Not only was disciplinary
confinement similar in conditions to other forms of punishment, but
the duration of Conner's sentence was also not affected by the
201. Conner, the inmate, was placed in segregated confinement as a result of "physical
interference to impair a correctional function" and for using foul language directed
towards a security guard. Id. at 475.
202. See id. at 475-76.
203. See id. at 483-86.
204. See id. at 482-83.
205. See id. at 482.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 484. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, who was joined by Justice Stevens, voiced
a familiar theme: "I see the Due Process Clause itself, not Hawaii's prison code, as the
wellspring of the protection due Conner.... [T]he process due by reason of the
Constitution should not depend on the particularities of the local prison's code." Id. at
489-90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 484.
210. See id. at 485.
211. See id. at 486.
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confinement.212  The state's prison regulation providing for
disciplinary confinement, therefore, did not give rise to a protectable
liberty interest.213
While knowledge of prior prisoner-rights cases is important in
understanding Woodard, the role of clemency in American
jurisprudence is significant as well. Clemency has its roots in
common-law England, where the sovereign held the authority to
grant mercy to lawbreakers.214 As were many other characteristics of
English law, the power to grant mercy was incorporated into the
post-Revolutionary American state governments.215 Most of the
states at that time allowed the governor alone to exercise the power
of clemency, and this decision was not reviewable by the courts. 16
Despite its strong historical underpinnings, clemency's role in
the American judicial process has been vigorously debated.217 Some
commentators believe that clemency performs an extralegal,
nonjudicial function by bestowing grace on lawfully convicted
individuals who otherwise have no right to a reduction or elimination
of their sentence.21 Derived from this view is the notion that the
courts have given these individuals all of the process that society has
mandated is due them; clemency is merely an extra chance given to
the individual, and, as such, no more process is due.219 Other
commentators claim that clemency forms an integral part of the
judicial process in that it helps to correct mistakes by the judiciary.20
Under this view, clemency is not gratuitous but is a necessary part of
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Korengold et al., supra note 13, at 352.
215. See id. at 354.
216. See id. at 355.
217. See, e.g., Kobil, supra note 98, at 215 (arguing that clemency is an "integral part of
our justice system"); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the
Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 572 (1991) (arguing that clemency
achieves justice "by individualizing sentences and remitting undeserved punishment");
Korengold et al., supra note 13, at 359 (arguing that declines in grants of clemency make
it no longer a realistic check on the judiciary); Palacios, supra note 13, at 331-32 (arguing
that commutation enhances justice by overriding the courts in particular cases);
Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 13, at 177 (arguing that clemency is only a matter of
grace).
218. See, e.g., Mark R. Schlakman, Clemency and the Battered Woman, FLA. B.J., Oct.
1994, at 72, 72; Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 13, at 177.
219. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 13, at 177-78.; see also Woodard, 118 S. Ct.
at 1251 (plurality opinion) ("Clemency proceedings ... do not determine ... guilt or
innocence ... and are not intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the trial
process.").
220. See Kobil, supra note 98, at 215 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12
(1993)).
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determining the guilt or innocence of individuals, particularly those
who have been wrongly convicted2 1
The debate over clemency's role in the judicial process forms
part of an overarching debate concerning whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Evitts v. Luceym created a second "strand" of due
process analysis. In Evitts, the Court held that inmates have a right
to effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right.? The
Evitts Court noted that "if a State has created appellate courts as 'an
integral part of the ... system for finally adjudicating the guilt or
innocence of a defendant,' the procedures used in deciding appeals
must comport with the demands of [due process]." 4  The Sixth
Circuit in Woodard applied this logic to state clemency proceedings.
It reasoned that clemency proceedings are an integral part of Ohio's
adjudicatory system, and as a result some due process is required.22
Because the clemency proceeding is far removed from trial, however,
only minimal process is due. 6 Under this reasoning, then, due
process is required to the extent that a particular state proceeding
assists in determining guilt or innocence.227 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this rationale, holding that a second "strand" of
due process analysis does not exist and that clemency is not an
integral part of the adjudicatory process.
Although the plurality in Woodard reaffirmed a familiar theme
in prior prisoner-rights cases-positivism 29-the recognition of a life
interest in capital clemency proceedings by a majority of the Court
221. See id. at 214; see also Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-12 (noting that clemency
historically has been available to prevent "miscarriages of justice"); Biddle v. Perovich,
274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (noting that clemency is not merely an act of grace but serves the
public welfare). Another commentator has argued that the Court uses commutation as a
"smokescreen" to justify denial of remedies to inmates and to support its "overall
deregulation of death." Palacios, supra note 13, at 335.
222. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
223. See id. at 396.
224. Id. at 393 (first alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18
(1956) (plurality opinion)).
225. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 107 F.3d 1178, 1186 (6th Cir. 1997),
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998).
226. See id. at 1186-87.
227. See id. at 1186.
228. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1250-51 (plurality opinion). Instead, the Court
continued its practice of using a two-step due process analysis. See id. at 1247-49
(plurality opinion); id. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Both the plurality and the concurrence framed the due process issue by first
determining if clemency creates an interest that the Fourteenth Amendment will protect
and then, if necessary, determining how much process is due. Indeed, the use of this
analysis was never questioned or challenged by any member of the Court.
229. See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
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was groundbreaking.20° Underlying differences between the plurality
opinion and the concurrence in Woodard, however, expose deep,
fundamental divisions between the Justices about the nature of
cognizable due process interests. The concurrence-fearing more
than the plurality that arbitrariness in the proceedings could
undermine due process-disregarded the historical underpinnings of
clemency and the availability of other remedies. 1 The plurality,
disagreeing with the concurrence as to what extent a life interest
should be recognized,z2 justified its result by using precedent
regarding liberty interests to analyze this life interest case. 3
Furthermore, the plurality and the concurrence conceptualized life
interests in quite different ways, each having its own problems. 24
Ultimately, what remains is a due process controversy left largely
unresolved by this case.
The plurality opinion in Woodard continued the practice of
examining state law as the source of protected interests, reaffirming
the utility of the positivist analysis.235 Throughout his opinion, the
Chief Justice emphasized the broad discretion afforded the Ohio
Governor in clemency determinations. 6  He also noted that
clemency is merely a "matter of grace," thus giving the executive a
wide range of factors to consider in making his decision. 7  Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that Ohio has not created a protectable
life or liberty interest in clemency proceedings through any of its
statutes, regulations, or practices."
230. See infra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
231. See infra notes 248-65 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 270-85 and accompanying text.
234. See infra notes 286-300 and accompanying text.
235. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1247-52 (plurality opinion).
236. The Chief Justice acknowledged that the Authority's procedures for conducting
clemency reviews were mandatory, much like the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz. See id.
at 1250 (plurality opinion). He distinguished Woodard's situation by emphasizing the fact
that the Governor had ultimate decisionmaking authority; the Authority's role was
merely advisory. See id. at 1250-51 (plurality opinion). The State had therefore not
created an interest that it was now attempting to ignore. See id. at 1251 (plurality
opinion). Additionally, as the Chief Justice noted, Woodard's claim of a protectable
interest in the clemency process itself is not cognizable under the Due Process Clause.
See id. at 1249 n.2 (plurality opinion).
237. Id. at 1250 (plurality opinion).
238. See id. (plurality opinion). The Chief Justice also noted that this conclusion
would not change under the new analysis from Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). See
Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1251 (plurality opinion). According to the Chief Justice, a denial
of clemency would not impose the kind of atypical hardship on an inmate envisioned by
the Court in Conner. See id. at 1251 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 200-13 and
accompanying text (discussing Conner). It would merely mean "that the inmate must
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Despite the plurality's reliance on positivist analysis, a majority
of the Justices moved in a new direction by expressing a willingness
to recognize a life (as opposed to liberty) interest in capital clemency
proceedings. 3 9 In procedural due process cases preceding Woodard,
the Court had searched for either "property" or "liberty" interests
that had been adversely affected by state action.240 The third interest
present in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment-"life"-had
rarely, if ever, been explicitly addressed in the context of procedural
due process.241 Thus, the five Justices who recognized a life interest
in clemency proceedings were willing to develop the Court's
procedural due process framework one step further.
Significantly, these five Justices potentially have paved the way
for a new avenue by which prisoners facing execution may
collaterally attack242 their death sentences. The Justices seem to
conceive of the life interest as existing independently of either state
laws or the nature of state action (such as clemency denial).243 Justice
O'Connor, for example, based her finding of a protectable life
serve the sentence originally imposed." Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1251 (plurality opinion).
239. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer each supported the
proposition that prisoners have a life interest in clemency proceedings. See id. at 1253
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1254-56 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240. See, e.g., Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 459 (1981)
(liberty interests); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 5 (1979) (liberty interests); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 569 (1972) (liberty and property interests); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972) (liberty interests).
241. See Kobil, supra note 98, at 217 ("[Tlhe Court has omitted mention of the
protection of life from most discussions of procedural due process."). Of course, the
Court has examined life interests in other contexts, such as the constitutionality of
abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the death penalty, see Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In the context of abortion, however, the Court dealt with
the issue of "life" only to the extent that it held that a human fetus is not a "person"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157. Death
penalty cases implicate the "life" language of the Fourteenth Amendment only to the
extent that capital punishment must be carried out using objective standards for
determining which convicted defendants live or die. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.3, at 491-96 (5th ed. 1995) (discussing the Court's definition
of "life").
242. Collateral attack is defined as "an attack made by or in an action or proceeding
that has an independent purpose other than impeaching or overturning the judgment."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990). For example, in Custis v. United States,
511 U.S. 485 (1994), a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding collaterally attacked
the validity of his sentence, maintaining that ineffective assistance of counsel at his earlier
state trials made those convictions fundamentally unfair. See id. at 487.
243. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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interest on the Fourteenth Amendment itself.2' Unlike the plurality,
she did not examine either Ohio law or the effect of a clemency
denial to determine that Woodard had a constitutionally protected
interest;245 instead, she relied on the view that every living person has
an interest in life that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.246
It is conceivable, then, that every prisoner facing death by execution
could challenge the state's clemency proceedings on the basis that the
state's procedures do not respect his interest in life.247
Despite the fact that five Justices may have paved the way for
groundbreaking due process jurisprudence, deep divisions still
separate these Justices and the Woodard plurality. Justice O'Connor
is more concerned than the Chief Justice about the possibility of
arbitrary state clemency proceedings.248 She agreed with the Chief
Justice that clemency historically has been committed to the
executive,249 but she noted that the possibility exists of "a scheme
whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant
clemency" or a "case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner
any access to its clemency process." z0 The Chief Justice, on the other
hand, is more willing to trust the executive.2 1 For instance, rather
than focus on the potential for arbitrary clemency decisions, he
highlighted the broad discretion afforded Ohio's Governor to grant
244. See id. at 1253 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
245. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
246. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Notably, neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Stevens provided support for this view,
empirical or otherwise; rather, they seemed to characterize it as a self-evident
proposition. See, e.g., id. at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("There is ... no room for legitimate debate about whether a living person has a
constitutionally protected interest in life. He obviously does.").
247. The problem with allowing a collateral attack at this stage in the process is that
"[t]he defendant has already had a full trial on the issue of guilt, and a trial on the issue of
penalty; the requirement of still [another] adjudication offers an invitation to those who
have nothing to lose by accepting it to advance entirely spurious claims." Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 435 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
248. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); see also Korengold et al., supra note 13, at 363 (discussing how the often
politicized nature of clemency decisions can lead to arbitrariness in those decisions).
249. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1253 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
250. Id. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
251. See id. at 1250-52 (plurality opinion). The Chief Justice has often shown
deference to the expertise and motives of state officials. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472,482 (1995) (noting that federal courts should defer to state officials); New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984) (creating a Miranda exception based on officers'
good-faith assessment of a public safety threat); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470 (1983)
(entrusting the day-to-day operation of prisons to the "expertise of prison officials").
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clemency. 2  For the Chief Justice, the Governor's need for
discretion outweighs the possibility that this decision may be
arbitrary.
Although the concern of the concurrence about arbitrary
clemency proceedings is well-placed, the plurality's position more
accurately reflects the nature of clemency in the context of
procedural due process. One could certainly imagine, as Justice
O'Connor argued,1 3 that discretion might result in arbitrariness. 25
For instance, one might envision a situation in which a Democratic
governor only granted clemency to prisoners who take an oath to
support the Democratic political party, or a scheme in which a male
governor only grants clemency to fellow males. But these examples
suffer from at least two flaws.
First, the concurrence's argument ignores the traditionally
executive-oriented nature of clemency.~ Clemency is not part of the
judicial process; if it were, it would not be vested in the executive.26
Clemency has "'not traditionally been the business of courts.' "I'
Instead, because of its inherently political nature, clemency has been
a decision for the executive to make based on any "wide range of
factors" 8 that the executive deems appropriate1 9  As with the
252. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1250-51 (plurality opinion).
253. See id. at 1254 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
254. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
255. See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Woodard (No. 96-1769); Abramowitz & Paget, supra
note 13, at 177.
256. Clemency is, however, also vested in the legislative branch at the federal level.
See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896); James N. Jorgensen, Note, Federal
Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U.
RICH. L. REv. 345,360 (1993).
257. Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1249 (plurality opinion) (quoting Connecticut Bd. of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,464 (1981)).
258. Id. at 1250 (plurality opinion).
259. See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Woodard (No. 96-1769); Brief for the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation at 3, Woodard (No. 96-1769); Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 13, at
177. Even scholars who argue for more procedural protections at the clemency stage
have acknowledged that clemency is (or has become) an essentially political decision.
See, e.g., Korengold et al., supra note 13, at 363-65. Commentators have argued, however,
that clemency decisions should be made based on considerations of justice, rather than
"inappropriate" political reasons. See, e.g., Kobil, supra note 217, at 610. But, as the
Court has pointed out previously, "individual acts of clemency inherently call for
discriminating choices because no two cases are the same." Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256,
268 (1974).
The inherently political nature of clemency raises the issue of whether the political
question doctrine bars courts from reviewing clemency decisions. This doctrine holds that
certain matters are better left resolved through political considerations rather than
through judicial review. See NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 241, § 2.15(a), at 104-05.
Just because the issue involves political facets, however, does not mean the courts cannot
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executive veto,26 the electorate decides whether the executive wields
her discretion in an overly arbitrary manner. Because the courts
have afforded an individual all of the formal procedural rights to
which society has entitled him, clemency operates only as an outlet
for mercy, which the executive may use on behalf of society when
society (through the executive) deems it necessary to override the
judicially imposed sentence.261
Second, the concurrence's argument ignores the availability of
other remedies against executive arbitrariness. The State may, of
course, choose to fetter the discretion of its executive in clemency
decisions by subjecting these decisions to state judicial review.2 62 As
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Conner, inmates may also
draw upon the Eighth Amendment2 63 and the Equal Protection
Clause2 4 in challenging arbitrary state proceedings.265
The plurality and the concurrence also differed sharply on the
extent to which the Court should recognize a "life" interest under the
Due Process Clause. Justice O'Connor, for instance, emphasized the
notion that an inmate facing execution continues to have an interest
in his life, despite the fact that his liberty interest has been
completely extinguished.266 That is, asserting that all of an inmate's
review it. See id. The Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), explained that
under the political question doctrine, despite the existence of political issues, the judiciary
can hear "the kind of controversy courts traditionally resolve." Id. at 696.
260. The veto is a "refusal by ... a governor to sign into law a bill that has been passed
by a legislature." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1565 (6th ed. 1990). Veto, unlike
clemency, is not a wholly executive function. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 69 (1974).
Thus, it is generally considered only a qualified power to the extent that it can be
overridden by the legislature. See id.
261. See Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 13, at 177 (arguing that clemency cannot be
challenged in the courts).
262. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,486 n.11 (1995).
263. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
264. The Equal Protection Clause states that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
265. See Conner, 515 U.S. at 487 n.11. In Dumschat, Chief Justice Burger noted that
the respondents had not raised any equal protection claim, suggesting that a challenge to
a state's commutation practices on those grounds could exist. See Connecticut Bd. of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 n.9 (1981). Similarly, in Woodard, the Chief
Justice noted that because Woodard had not raised an equal protection claim, the Court
had no occasion to decide that particular issue. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1247 n.1
(plurality opinion). It appears, then, that the Court has not foreclosed a challenge to state
clemency decisions on equal protection grounds.
266. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that it is "incorrect ... to say that a prisoner has
been deprived of all interest in his life before execution").
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liberty has been extinguished by conviction is quite different than
asserting that all of an inmate's life has been extinguished, even
before execution. 67 Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand,
noted that an inmate's interest in his life is determined at trial; he
may still be interested in his life at the clemency stage, but he has no
legal right to that interest.2 8 By the time the inmate has reached the
clemency stage, the Chief Justice claimed, he has only a residual life
interest, for example, "in not being summarily executed by prison
guards. 269
Although the plurality's view on life interests adheres to
prisoner-rights precedent concerning liberty, it does not fully explain
why cases involving "liberty" interests should be used to decide a
case involving a purported "life" interest. Before Woodard, the
Court generally took a restricted view of prisoners' liberty interests
under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the Court in
Greenholtz rejected the notion that parole release implicates a liberty
interest independent of any State law.70 Dumschat stood for the
proposition that an inmate's appeal for commutation, like a request
for parole, is merely a "unilateral hope" undeserving of Fourteenth
Amendment protection.27 In Woodard, the Chief Justice merely
applied the same principles to appeals for clemency by inmates facing
execution,272 but he did not explain the implication of this application
to claims such as Woodard's. The liberty interest involved with
respect to the individual prisoner is physical freedom;273 but the
interest involved in Woodard with respect to the individual prisoner
is life itself,2 74 and, as Justice Stevens points out in his dissent in
Woodard, an inmate's interest in being alive is qualitatively different
from an interest in merely being free. 75
267. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
268. See id. at 1249-50 (plurality opinion).
269. Id. at 1250 (plurality opinion). For a discussion of the "residual" life interest, see
infra notes 286-93 and accompanying text.
270. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
11 (1979).
271. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981) (citing
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11).
272. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1249-51 (plurality opinion).
273. See, e.g., Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 459-67.
274. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1253 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). For an extensive discussion of this point, see Kobil, supra note 98, at
201-26.
275. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Insofar as Justice Stevens was concerned, this difference is a self-evident truth. See
id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Yet although he declared it a
self-evident truth, Justice Stevens underscored his point by noting that "'death is a
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On one hand, it seems inapposite to use cases that turn on a
recognition of liberty interests to decide a case involving a life
interest.276 For example, the Chief Justice applied Dumschat to bar
Woodard's claim,277 but Dumschat focused on an inmate's interest in
being free from restraint upon commutation of his sentence.278
Because the inmate in Dumschat did not face execution, it would be
illogical to conclude that he needed due process protection for his
life. 79 Woodard, however, faced state action that would soon deprive
him of life, not just liberty."0
On the other hand, it might be entirely appropriate for the Court
to rely on cases involving liberty interests to decide Woodard's case.
In Greenholtz, for example, the Court relied on Roth-a case
involving property interests-to decide whether the prisoner's claim
implicated a protectable liberty interest.281 In Roth, the Court noted
that a protectable property interest does not arise out of the Due
Process Clause merely because of an individual's "unilateral
expectation" of some benefit.' Similarly, in Greenholtz, the Court
held that a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause
different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country ... it is
different in both its severity and its finality.'" Id. at 1256 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977)). Indeed,
since at least 1957, the Court has been concerned with the procedural fairness of death
penalty cases. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Because of the severity of this particular punishment, the Court has often displayed
enhanced sensitivity regarding its use. The Court has held, for instance, that insane
individuals may not be executed, even when insanity sets in after conviction. See Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986). Also, capital defendants must be given an
opportunity to present mitigating circumstances to the jury, which must be given the
choice of either imposing the death penalty or the lesser sentence of life imprisonment.
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,303-05 (1976).
276. Justices O'Connor and Stevens both noted the impropriety of comparing
Woodard's life interest to the liberty interest at stake in Dumschat. See Woodard, 118 S.
Ct. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
277. See id. at 1249-50 (plurality opinion).
278. See Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 459-67.
279. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
280. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Chief Justice
and Justice Stevens did not have a common understanding of "life" in the context of this
case. Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to consider an inmate facing execution as having
already lost his "life" at the moment his death sentence was handed down at trial, see id.
at 1252 n.5 (plurality opinion), but Justice Stevens considered an inmate's "life" to
continue until the inmate is physically executed, see id. at 1255 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
281. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
7 (1979) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
282. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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cannot arise merely because of an inmate's "hope that the benefit
will be obtained."' 3  To apply this principle to a purported life
interest in the Due Process Clause does not necessarily seem to
stretch precedent.s 4 Unfortunately, the Chief Justice did not explain
why reliance on Dumschat and Greenholtz is appropriate; he offered
no more than the conclusory statement that "[a]n appeal for
clemency... 'is simply a unilateral hope.' "2
While the plurality opinion remained true to precedent, its view
with respect to life interests lacks intuitive clarity. Even though the
Chief Justice was unwilling to recognize a "continuing" life interest,
he expressed his opinion that a "residual" life interest exists such that
a prisoner may not be executed outside the normal parameters of the
originally imposed death sentencel 6 This "partial" life interest is
similar to an inmate's liberty interest that may be infringed if the
nature of the state's punishment is outside the range contemplated in
the original sentence.- 7 In cases involving prisoners' liberty interests,
the Court has recognized that although the conviction has
extinguished an inmate's expectation of liberty, an inmate retains a
small amount of liberty2 81 That small amount of liberty prevented
the state in Washington v. Harper,2 9 for instance, from arbitrarily
administering psychotropic drugs to an inmate against his will.290 In
Woodard, the Chief Justice extended this reasoning to an inmate's
interest in life.291 Although an inmate no longer has a legitimate
expectation of life after he has been sentenced to death, the Chief
Justice argued that the inmate does retain a small amount of interest
283. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
284. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1973) (noting that the Court's
positivist analysis of liberty "parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property").
But see Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17 (1981) (holding that the "mutually explicit
understandings" language relied upon in a "property" interest case did not relate to the
"liberty" interest asserted by the respondent).
285. Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1249 (plurality opinion) (quoting Connecticut Bd. of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,465 (1981)).
286. See id. at 1250 (plurality opinion).
287. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,483-84 (1995); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238,247 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,225 (1976).
288. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7;
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56.
289. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
290. See id. at 221. Harper involved a claim by an inmate that he should have received
a judicial hearing before involuntarily being administered psychotropic drugs to calm his
violent conduct. See id. at 210. Although the Court recognized that the inmate had some
liberty interest in not being administered the drug, the Court determined that the state-
provided procedures available to him were sufficient under the Due Process Clause. See
id. at 222.
291. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1250 (plurality opinion).
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in his life such that the State may only execute him in accordance
with his sentence.21 While this reasoning squares with precedent, it
does not seem to make sense intuitively. It may be logical to say that
an individual can have most of his liberty taken away and yet retain a
small amount, but it seems counterintuitive to say that an inmate
facing execution can have part of his life taken away while retaining
some lesser portion. The Chief Justice, however, offered little
elucidation for this point. He merely asserted without explanation
that Greenholtz "makes clear" that Woodard cannot use his residual
life interest to "challenge the clemency determination by requiring
the procedural protections he seeks."293
The concurrence, on the other hand, relied on a common-sense
interpretation of a life interest. Justice O'Connor framed the issue as
whether Woodard had an interest in his life that was sufficiently
protected by the Due Process Clause so as to require procedural
safeguards in Ohio's clemency proceedings.294 It makes sense, of
course, to say that an inmate facing death would have an interest in
his life;295 but having an interest in life does not necessarily mean that
an individual possesses a constitutionally recognizable life interest. 6
This life interest, however defined, is at least a discrete, definable
concept. As such, a life interest can be taken away Without actually
taking away life itself.297  Accordingly, the judicial system can
292. See id. (plurality opinion).
293. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at 7).
294. See id. at 1253-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Professor Kobil, arguing that the Court should recognize a life interest under
the Due Process Clause, also appears to frame the issue in this way. See Kobil, supra note
98, at 207 ("A life interest would seem to be extant so long as the person draws breath.").
He argues that an unfavorable decision by the clemency authority deprives a person,
literally, of life. See id. at 217. It cannot be otherwise, he claims, unless we are prepared
"to make the harrowing admission that for purposes of the Due Process Clause he is
already dead." Id. In his brief to the Supreme Court, Woodard's attorney made a similar
point when he noted that Woodard is not "legally dead." Brief for Respondent at 3,
Woodard (No. 96-1769). In reply, the Ohio Attorney General argued that denying
Woodard a life interest at the clemency stage does not render him legally dead. See
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, Woodard, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (No. 96-1769). Instead, "[i]t
just establishes that with respect to the requirements of due process, the life interest Mr.
Woodard had before killing Mani Akram has been given the process it is due." Id. at 1.
295. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1255-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Kobil, supra note 98, at 207 ("[Iln the case of a clemency request by a
prisoner sentenced to death, is it not an interest in life that is being asserted, rather than
an interest in liberty?").,
296. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1249-50 (plurality opinion).
297. See id. at 1250 (plurality opinion). An analogy can be made to property interests.
Although a person might have an interest in property, such as a job, it does not follow
that the person has a constitutionally protected property interest in that job. See generally
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adjudicate away one's life interest, even though one continues to
have an interest in life itself. 9s
The concurrence's interpretation of a life interest also comes at
the expense of established precedent. In analyzing procedural due
process cases involving prisoners, the Court has established that it
must examine the "nature" of the interest at stake rather than the
potential impact of the State's action on the prisoner.299 Thus, the
relevant issue in Woodard was whether the inmate has a life interest
in Ohio's clemency proceedings that is protected by the Due Process
Clause."0  But the concurrence's alternative focus-whether
Woodard had an interest in his life-led it to consider what would
happen to Woodard if clemency were denied. If it were denied,
Woodard would be executed-an obviously serious loss to him. By
considering the impact of the State's actions on Woodard, however,
Justice O'Connor appears to have relied on a Morrissey-type
"grievous loss" analysis of due process, which has not been used since
the Roth Court bifurcated the procedural due process analysis.
The Court's struggle over when to recognize due process rights
for prisoners is not completely resolved by Woodard. Partly because
of its limited holding,30' Woodard only hints at the future direction of
due process rights for prisoners facing execution. Four Justices in
Woodard agreed with Justice O'Connor that clemency proceedings
create minimal due process rights for inmates under a sentence of
death. ° In future cases involving challenges to clemency procedures
by inmates facing execution, then, Justice O'Connor's opinion could
likely hold the upper hand.0 3
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that an
untenured college professor did not have a constitutionally recognizable property interest
in his job). An at-will employee, for example, has no property right in his job, see
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 241, § 13.5(d), at 519-21, but so long as he is employed
he continues to have the job itself.
298. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1250 (plurality opinion).
299. See supra notes 102-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's present
procedural due process analysis).
300. See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1247 (plurality opinion).
301. See supra note 62 (discussing the significance of plurality opinions).
302 See Woodard, 118 S. Ct. at 1254 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens noted his
approval of Justice O'Connor's concurrence. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). His only disagreement with Justice O'Connor was whether the case
required a remand to the district court. See id. at 1256-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
303. In Woodard, even Justice Stevens agreed that only minimal due process
protections are required in capital clemency proceedings. See id. at 1256-57 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Therefore, in cases in which the inmate claims
a life interest but the record clearly shows that he has received notice and an opportunity
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The court in Woodard employed the procedural due process
analysis, which focused its inquiry on whether the "life" language of
the Due Process Clause is implicated in state clemency proceedings.
But this method merely prolonged the debate by not adequately
accounting for the unique nature of capital clemency proceedings, 304
as reflected by Justice O'Connor's concerns about the potential for
arbitrariness in clemency procedures and Chief Justice Rehnquist's
desire not to restrict the broad discretion of those to whom the
clemency power is committed. 5 Perhaps a better standard for
measuring an inmate's due process rights in capital clemency
proceedings is to "couple a strong presumption in favor of
administrative discretion ... with a willingness to review decisions on
a case-by-case basis as a safeguard against patently arbitrary
action. ,306
This method of review would help alleviate Justice O'Connor's
justifiable concern that capital clemency proceedings not be infected
by arbitrariness.3 7  Rather than recognize a fully protectable life
interest under the Due Process Clause, which arguably does not exist
at the clemency stage,08 this practice would erect a framework by
which the Court could review "patently arbitrary" clemency decisions
by state officials. Because only patently arbitrary decisions would be
reviewed, however, state officials would still retain a wide range of
discretion in clemency decisions.
Although Woodard casts doubt on the efficacy of the Court's
manner of pigeonholing state actions into only three due process
interests (life, liberty, and property), the proposed case-by-case
method would not require the Court to abandon this approach.
Rather, it would merely require the Court to treat clemency
to participate in the clemency hearing, the Court probably will fully recognize the
inmate's life interest (unlike in Woodard) but determine that the interest has been
adequately protected. Such a case presumably would expand prisoners' rights but,
ironically, would conclude with effectively the same result as Woodard.
304. See Herman, supra note 7, at 516-17 (questioning the utility of attempting to
define liberty and property interests in procedural due process cases).
305. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying
considerations in the opinions of both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor). It
also has been argued that this method of analysis fails to deal adequately with the capital
nature of clemency. See Coleen E. Klasmeier, Towards a New Understanding of Capital
Clemency and Procedural Due Process, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1507, 1539 (1995) (",[Capital
clemency is qualitatively distinct from parole denial and thus merits a different
analysis.").
306. Flax, supra note 7, at 926. Professor Flax advocates this standard as a means for
remedying state action in general. See id. at 925.
307. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
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proceedings as a special subset of the entire procedural due process
controversy. Implicit in this treatment would be the recognition that
an individual's life interest is not divisible or extinguishable in the
same way that a liberty interest is typically held to be.30 9 In this way,
it would differ from the plurality's view that only a "residual" life
interest exists after trial. But the proposed method balances the life
interest recognition with a strong presumption that in capital
clemency proceedings the executive is not acting arbitrarily. Implicit
in this part of the standard is the recognition that clemency has not
historically been reviewable by the courts; therefore, only clearly
arbitrary uses of the authority should be subject to judicial review.
Not only would this practice protect against flagrant executive
misuse of clemency power, but it would also free executive
decisionmaking discretion from the rigid demands of due process. At
least in the limited context of capital clemency proceedings, this
standard could mitigate part of the controversy over prisoners' due
process rights. 10 Woodard makes clear, however, that the Court's
ongoing struggle to determine the due process rights of prisoners in
other contexts is far from over.
PHILLIP JOHN STRACH
309. See supra notes 287-93 and accompanying text (discussing the divisibility of life
and liberty interests).
310. Others have argued for a more rigid standard: the right to "meaningful"
clemency proceedings. Professor Kobil suggests, for instance, that a right to seek
clemency is empty without some guarantee that it will receive meaningful consideration.
See Kobil, supra note 98, at 218 n.86. He argues that because clemency is "an integral
part of our federal constitutional scheme ... it ought to function in a meaningful way."
Id. at 219-220. A related view is that states themselves should provide meaningful
clemency proceedings. See generally Daniel Lim, State Due Process Guarantees for
Meaningful Death Penalty Clemency Proceedings, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 47
(1994) (arguing for meaningful clemency proceedings at the state level). One interesting
suggestion for countering the discretion of the executive in clemency proceedings has
been to give state legislatures the same discretion and authority as the executive to grant
clemency. See Kobil, supra note 217, at 615.
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